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The capabilities approach (CA) most closely associated with the thinner and 
thicker versions of Sen and Nussbaum has the potential to provide a 
paradigm shift for critical social policy, encompassing but also transcending 
some of the limitations associated with the Marshallian social citizenship 
approach. The article argues however that it cannot simply be imported from 
the majority world, rather there is a need to bear in mind in the critical 
literature that developed around it. This is generally discussed and then 
critically applied to case studies of applications of CA in the developed 
capitalist world, particularly The Equalities Review conducted for the Equality 
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Introduction: A new, improved paradigm for critical 
social policy?  
Until recently human rights have not been treated as a major issue for 
mainstream social policy in the minority developed world.  On the whole       
„core‟ human rights are seen primarily identified with civil and political (CP) 
rights and liberties such as freedom of expression and assembly, and voting 
rights, rather than extensive economic and social (ESC) rights to full 
employment, social security and social provision. While T H Marshall (1948) 
did formulate a theory of the relation between them, this holistic focus has 
been largely lost. Since then social policy has largely confined itself to the 
analysis of social citizenship rights. In this article I argue that the capabilities 
approach (CA) potentially provides a robust and politically progressive means 
of re-connecting these issues within a broad human rights discourse. At the 
same time it can also enable us to address many of the problems identified 
with Marshallian social policy, such as its exclusive focus upon (and defence 
of) class inequality, its silence on issues of „race‟, age, gender, sexuality and 
disability, and its nation-bound Anglocentric focus (e.g. Williams, 1989).  
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Rather than seeking to bend the citizenship paradigm in increasingly 
contorted directions, there is arguably a need for a paradigm shift in critical 
social policy. This should arguably involve a broad and inclusive focus on    
human rights bringing both CP and ESC rights into a single frame of holistic 
analysis focused on people‟s needs and entitlements. This would raise 
questions about how to frame rights of people within a particular society such 
as the contemporary UK, regardless of their political status as „citizens‟, and 
also compel us to be concerned about the needs and rights of people 
everywhere. In Britain the need for such a shift in critical social policy has 
been pressing since the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA) incorporated the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into British law. 
Subsequently the Equality Act 2006 established a Commission on Equality 
and Human Rights (CEHR) for Great Britain mirroring one established for 
Northern Ireland in 1999. This drew together human rights and a raft of new or 
revised anti-discrimination legislation in „race‟, gender, disability, gender, 
religion and belief, age and sexual orientation into a single system of 
governance.      
According to McLaughlin (2007: 111) this system creates a „new equality 
architecture‟ which puts „the UK at the forefront of international developments 
in equality law‟. However the ECHR is nearly 60 years old and currently 
mainly restricted to basic CP rights.  A campaign has thus ensued since 1998 
to include ESC rights in a broader UK Bill of Rights, in line with the UK‟s treaty 
obligation since 1976 under the United Nations International Covenant. The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (2008) has endorsed calls 
for a UK Bill of Rights and Freedoms. Superficially there is a cross party 
consensus on the need for new legislation, but this masks different agendas. 
Politicians of both major parties were initially queuing up to respond to right 
wing tabloid accusations that the HRA was a „charter‟ for criminals and 
terrorists. Subsequently in 2007 Gordon Blair published a Green Paper on 
constitutional reform early in his premiership. A key feature was a proposed 
„British Bill of Rights and Duties‟ with the aim of codifying British citizenship to 
cement national identity as a unifying principle in a society increasingly 
splintered by class, ethnicity, race, gender, disability, sexuality, age and faith 
(Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, 2007). Chapter 3 of the 
Joint Committee Report addresses nationality issues in ways that 
differentiates its approach to the Green Paper first by calling for a „Bill of 
Rights and Freedoms‟ (emphasis added). Rather than reigning in CP rights it 
calls for a „HRA plus‟ which extends these beyond the „floor‟ of the ECHR and 
also adds ESC rights. It called for the government to „decouple‟ questions of 
Bill of Rights from „the rights and duties of the citizen‟ and make a clear 
commitment to their universal application to residents of Britain, along with an 
outward rather than inward looking approach to „British values‟.  It goes on to 
argue that as well as non-citizens such rights should be extended to cover 
„vulnerable‟ groups such as children, disabled people, workers including 
migrants, victims of crime, and members of religious, linguistic and ethnic 
minorities (op. cit: 41-2). The Report particularly identifies asylum seekers as 
a group denied human rights (op. cit.: 56). It also endorses the inclusion of so-
called „third generation‟ rights, i.e. those beyond traditional CP and ESC 
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rights, particularly the right to a healthy and sustainable environment (op. cit.: 
59).  
An extended analysis of the politics of a Bill of Rights is beyond the scope of 
the current article, including the question of whether constitutional 
entrenchment and judicial oversight is the best road to realising rights. There 
are dangers involved in that a future Cameron Conservative government 
might try to enact a limited basket of rights entrenched through a German 
style Basic Law, preventing Parliament in future from extending civil or social 
rights (Charter, 2006). All the more important then that the Joint Committee 
has set a progressive benchmark for the future, one that shows the complex 
interconnections and dissonances between human rights and citizenship 
rights discourses, and indicates ways that a renewed commitment of 
principles of universalism and diversity can be realised.  
It is true that human rights have been receiving more attention in social policy 
but usually this has involved either focusing on international issues or the 
most marginalised groups in the UK, rather than seeing it as a mainstream 
issue linking the two. It is starting to happen with Dean (2007) arguing that 
human rights are often restricted to a CP discourse and social policy can 
ensure a stronger emphasis on „welfare‟ or ESC rights. Equally however 
social policy could be castigated for ignoring CP rights. The division between 
the two was the product of a world polarised by the Cold War and with the 
demise of state communism and triumph of global neoliberalism, narrow 
views of human rights predominated excluding ESC rights defining freedom 
„negatively‟ in terms of liberal democracy and free markets. However this has 
also been strongly contested by social movements and activists and following 
the World Conference on Human Rights, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action emphasized the indivisibility of CP and ESC rights. 
Against this background, this article therefore examines the potential of the 
capabilities approach (CA) to provide a holistic framework for integrating 
critical social policy and broad human rights concerns consistent with the 
approach taken by the Joint Committee. A characteristic feature of CA, as we 
shall see, is an insistence that civil freedoms, democracy, social opportunities 
and equalities are interdependent. The basis for such an integration has 
already been laid as CA, developed originally by Sen (1999) and extended by 
Nussbaum (2000) to inform development policy in the majority world, will 
provide „equality benchmarks‟ by which the EHRC will judge progress up to 
2010 and beyond, following the work undertaken by The Equalities Review 
(2007). CA is a human rights informed theory and set of methodologies which 
arose to challenge orthodox neoclassical economics and neoliberal ideologies 
of progress human focused solely on economic growth and per capita income, 
and was a key influence in the development of the United Nations (UN) 
Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990. Yet though it has considerable 
potential to facilitate a paradigm shift for critical social policy, if its progressive 
potential is to be realised it must be embedded in an internationalist human 
rights approach. This must  also take due account of the critical debates that 
have surfaced around CA‟s approach to development in the majority world 
that make it at best a partial challenge to global capitalist agendas.  
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As Freeman (2002: 6) argues human rights are not „things‟ which either do or 
do not exist, rather they are contested „just claims or entitlements that derive 
from moral and/or legal rules‟ (original emphasis). He also argues that 
determining what these might be requires a „theory of human rights‟ to show 
how these might be „validated‟. Liberal „negative‟ conceptions of CP rights 
were often premised following Locke on a pre-social „natural rights‟ of the 
individual. In reaction to this following Bentham „legal positivist‟ conceptions 
denied such foundational connections and sought also to separate questions 
of law from ethical considerations. CA, as well as integrating CP and ESC 
rights, also potentially transcends this epistemological polarisation. While 
moral and ethical in orientation, it can be ontologically grounded in social 
scientific knowledge about „what it is to be human‟, connecting this to a realist 
theory of „need‟ such as that developed by Doyal and Gough (1991).   
 
The Capabilities Approach through Thick and Thin 
While there is a vast literature1 capabilities research has generated two main 
paradigms, the „thinner‟ version of Sen (1999) in Development as Freedom 
(hereafter DF) and the „thicker‟ version of Nussbaum (2000, 2001). The basic 
tenets of CA are simple though they open up issues of considerable 
philosophical, political and sociological complexity. Essentially they address 
central enlightenment themes about how to judge human progress, how to 
reconcile liberty and justice, and how to take account of both procedural and 
substantive requirements for ensuring social justice. CA does not imply these 
are easy issues to reconcile, but there is an in-built optimism about the 
possibilities for rational action and achieving fair results. As a result CA tends 
to be prescriptive and evaluative, rather than explanatory, which gives rise to 
some significant problems. There are also substantial questions about 
operationalizing CA, and the role of government and civil society in 
implementing it.  
CA asserts the essential similarity of our human needs and potentialities. It is 
a holistic and humanistic approach that places the whole person – what we 
are able to do or be – at the centre of social analysis and public action. In 
Sen‟s thinner and classic formulation capabilities are the abilities and 
possibilities that we acquire in order to exercise „valuable functionings‟ or 
„beings and doings‟. These are the outcomes we individually or as a result of 
our cultural values believe would constitute „the good life‟, to enable us to 
„flourish‟ as human beings and achieve „personhood‟. The expansion in 
available commodities made possible by the global market in his view 
facilitates this, but it is not an end in itself. Thus Sen disputes that economic 
growth or consumption of goods are in themselves markers of progress, as 
they may or may not expand capabilities and functionings. Valuable 
functionings also include non-market activities such as religious practices, 
social activities and caring work. Notions of progress or „human development‟ 
therefore must embrace a wider inventory. Sen‟s emphasis on „freedom‟, not 
just „choice‟, is central. While he strongly defends liberal democracy against 
communism, colonialism and other forms of authoritarian rule, he goes further 
by embracing the idea of „substantive freedoms‟. This goes beyond the 
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„negative‟ concept of liberty from the state championed historically by the 
rising middle class. It fleshes out what is meant by a „positive‟ concept of 
liberty (Berlin, 1969) as public action to make freedoms available to those who 
would otherwise be denied them, as advanced by labour and socialist 
movements.  
Sen‟s emphasis on substantive freedoms critiques of the limitations of free 
markets, and makes a strong argument in favour of public goods. The way 
that he develops this, however, generates tensions between individual and 
collective capabilities, which has been much debated. On the one hand Sen 
argues for the „freedoms of individuals as basic building blocks‟ (DF: 18). On 
the other, he argues for public goods that cannot be delivered by individuals 
pursuing their rational self-interest. Thus, it is not possible to buy a malaria 
free environment. He defends social provisioning in basic education can also 
be cheaper and more effective than private provision (DF: 128-9). Although 
Sen‟s work grew out of the „basic needs‟ development approach from the 
1970s, with an emphasis on nutrition, primary health care and education, it  
also encompasses complex functionings such as artistic or sporting 
accomplishments. CA recognises that people are not equally placed to realise 
their human capabilities, due to barriers arising from structural inequalities of 
class, „race‟, disability gender and sexual oppression. Tackling these is central 
to CA‟s theory of social justice, distinguishing it from the Rawlsian approach 
which has influenced New Labour (e.g. through the work of the Commission 
on Social Justice (1994). Rather than redistributing a minimum of necessary 
goods solely through a basic income (Rawls, 1999), CA is outcome rather 
than input focused and insists that some people may require additional 
resources to develop capabilities and transform them into functionings 
(„conversion factors‟). A wheelchair user may not for example be able to buy 
access to the public sphere if there are steps barring their access to a public 
library or if discriminatory processes restrict their employment opportunities 
(DF: 73). Thus CA takes account of the fact that playing field is bumpier for 
some groups than others, and offers ways of reconciling principles of equality 
and diversity in social justice. 
In contrast to the dominant utilitarian approach associated with neoclassical 
economics and neoliberal ideology, which values subjective outcomes such 
as wants, desires, and „the pursuit of happiness‟, CA is more grounded in 
what people are and do, their „valuable beings and doings‟ (DF: 75). The 
notion of „valuable‟ implies ethical and political judgements, in other words 
discrimination between functionings some of which might be regarded as 
reprehensible (Alkire, 2005: 121). Some needs might be considered more 
important than others, consistent from the priority given to „basic needs‟. 
Philosophically CA draws selectively on Marx‟s conception of „alienation‟ and 
vision of reforming society to bring it in line with our creative and associative 
natures, and more extensively on Aristotle‟s ethics on the purpose of 
humanity being to realise the „good life‟ (. The goal of economic and public 
policy is thus defined as „a process of expanding the substantive freedoms 
that people have‟ (DF: 297). Thus Sen cuts through the reductionism of 
orthodox economics to place human beings at the centre. However his 
position remains ambiguous, involving bedrock though conditional support for 
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the market and economic growth, technical growth and modernisation, if they 
enhance substantive freedoms. 
There is considerable overlap between Sen and Nussbaum, though the latter 
focuses less on welfare economics than philosophical debates about social 
justice, strongly animated by liberal-humanist feminist principles. While Sen‟s 
is a general model of capabilities, Nussbaum (2000) specifically seeks to put 
claims on government.  While Sen permits the democratic process to arrive at 
capabilities for a culture, Nussbaum sees personhood as giving rise to certain 
universal preconditions for the exercise of capabilities which governments 
should aim to guarantee. Robeyns (2005: 104) argues that as a result Sen‟s 
approach is more formally objectivist and concerned with questions of 
measurement, while Nussbaum‟s is experientially concerned with personal 
„narrative‟, in order „to better understand people‟s hopes, desires, aspirations, 
motivations and decisions‟. It is thus more open to qualititative research and 
participative approaches to evaluation.  
Nussbaum (2000, 2001), places more emphasis than Sen on „adaptive 
preferences‟. Nussbaum critiques the „subjective welfarism‟ inhibiting   
orthodox economics from making judgements about „tastes‟ and „preferences‟ 
expressed through market choices. She argues that for oppressed and poor 
people „habit, fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions 
deform people‟s choices and even their wishes for the own lives‟ (Nussbaum, 
2000: 114). She cites examples of Indian women whom she worked with 
tolerating domestic violence and discriminatory wage systems rather than 
seeing them as a violation of their rights, as „this was how things were and 
would be‟ (Nussbaum, 2001: 68). People‟s existing preferences and 
judgements of needs are thus not necessarily a reliable basis for policy, 
because of the problem of „preference deformation‟. Nussbaum is aware that 
there are parallels with Marx‟s much criticised concept of „false 
consciousness‟. This is one reason why she departs from Sen in arguing for a 
list of „central human capabilities‟ open to public scrutiny, discussion and 
amendment over time, to be incorporated in all constitutions. These are 
specified as a list of 10 capabilities in Figure 1. It is important to realise that 
neither Sen nor Nussbaum propose extensive equality, rather minimum 
thresholds to enable all humans to flourish.  
[ Figure 1 near here]  
 
Sen and Nussbaum:  Critics or Critical Friends of 
Market Neoliberalism? 
 
In appearing to offer a happy medium between liberal and socialist principles, 
reconciling universalism and diversity, is CA a hopelessly contradictory 
exercise? I do not think so, but while CA is a promising paradigm for a 
realisable project, the dominant versions fail to sufficiently critique liberal 
individualism, have an inadequate theory of the state within global capitalism, 
and a naïve essentialist view of the market. As a consequence mainstream 
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CA is not as interventionist and egalitarian as at first sight appears, and as a 
fuller practical realisation of CA principles might require. However while Sen 
and Nussbaum cannot be portrayed quite as saintly anti-market scourges of 
neoliberalism, I do not think they can be simply dismissed as individualist 
market wolves in capabilities clothing. There is rather a mismatch between the 
laudable and ambitious aims of CA and the more limited means proposed for 
realising them.  
Considerable criticism of mainstream CA has centred on its liberal 
individualist framework and the failure to sufficiently acknowledge the extent 
of group capabilities (e.g. Robeyns, 2005). While CA acknowledges group 
influences on individual capabilities, it does not explicitly sanction them at the 
collective level, e.g. the efforts of labour and other social movements, for 
example ethnic minorities, disabled people, or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) to sustain a collective cultural integrity and resources in 
the face of a hostile society. Thus Evans (2002: 56) argues that Sen is a 
„good Manchester liberal‟ who „focuses on individuals and their relation to an 
overall social context, not on collectivities as the necessary link between the 
two‟. Other suggest that Sen‟s theory is a modified form of neoliberalism, 
consistent with the „post-Washington consensus‟ that emerged out of the 
critique of the unbridled market in the 1980s and failure of structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs). It highlights the need to bring the state back in to 
correct some of the worst effects of the market, without fundamentally 
restricting its influence, consistent with Third Way discourses. Sandbrook 
(1999: 1071) depicts Sen as an eloquent defender of the free market system 
„far removed from the crude reductionism of orthodox neoclassical analysis‟. A 
close reading of Development as Freedom readily provides examples of how 
a radical CA rhetoric is combined with a quite conservative economic policy 
supportive of monetarist restrictions on public spending, what he calls „fiscal 
prudence‟ (DF:130). Sen also expresses concerns that unemployment 
insurance may be problematic in reducing incentives to market labour, and 
acknowledges that questions may be raised concerning the availability for free 
health care and education on grounds of need and ability to pay (DF: 130). He 
accepts in principle that there may be a case for means-testing though its 
implementation may cause problems (DF: 134-7).  
Sandbrook argues that all this is consistent with the shift to the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) introduced by the World 
Bank President, James Wolfensohn in 1999. This aims to improving the 
effectiveness of development assistance in reducing poverty through a long-
term, „results‟ or needs-based outcome focus. It claims to be democratic 
rather than top down, by fostering country-led partnerships with the private 
and voluntary sector, linked to the UN‟s Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Klees (2002) has argued that the shift from „pure‟ neoliberal SAPs 
enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank to a less 
apparently dictatorial partnership approach with countries through the sector 
wide approaches (SWAPs) associated with the CDF, was an attempt to give 
some ground to incorporate critical NGOs (Klees 2002: 111). Sandbrook 
argues that Sen reifies the market as natural and „essentialist‟, and largely 
celebrates the efficiencies and expansion of goods that it entails, with strong 
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echoes of Hayek and Adam Smith. The pages of Development as Freedom 
have few references to multinational corporations, or the role of international 
institutions like the IMF or World Bank, let alone the effects of the US as a 
dominant world power in a post-communist world. 
He and Nussbaum tend to presume the existence of a world in which the state 
basically has sovereignty over its affairs and there are few external 
constraints upon it. Modernity or adherence to a tradition is sometimes seen 
by Sen as a political choice that states and societies can exercise, if at cost to 
efficiency. However in the next breath he portrays globalization as both an 
autonomous and unstoppable force, and the best that can be done is to slow 
it down, and offer people transitional support, echoing Third Way approaches 
(DF: 241). 
Robeyns (2005) does acknowledge that CA needs to be supplemented by a 
theory of causes, rather than simply being normative and pragmatic. However 
there is a danger that this will only be developed superficially, rather than 
identifying and targeting deeper drivers, or what critical realist analysis calls 
deeper „generative mechanisms‟ (Bhaskar, 1975). As a result CA tends to 
seek to empower people in ways that involve modified reproduction of market 
and other social relations, not acknowledging that emancipation might require 
their collective transformation (see Joseph, 1998). Thus Navarro (2000) 
argues that power relations and inequality are under-theorized by Sen. Bagchi 
(2000: 4412) complains that Sen underplays the ways that market expansion 
perpetuates unfree forms of labour, and his celebration of liberal democracy is 
not a realistic portrayal „of how actually existing democracy operates under 
the capitalist order‟. Both Zimmerman (2006) and Jackson (2005) have 
focused centrally on the individualist limitations of Sen‟s theory, and the ways 
in which social structures, power and culture are only partially acknowledged. 
Zimmerman argues that Sen largely sees the wider environment as a context 
shaping individual agency, rather than developing a more sociologically 
grounded interactive or relational model. Jackson traces this to an incomplete 
critique of neoclassical economics, and an excessive faith in liberal political 
theory. He advocates linking CA to critical sociology, something which is in its 
early days.  Sayer (2005) for example has begun to sketch out linkages 
between a realist approach to class based on Bourdieu‟s conception of the 
„habitus‟, and Nussbaum‟s thicker approach to CA. Thus while much of the 
critical discussion has centred on Sen, latterly Nussbaum has deservedly 
been receiving more attention. For example, Menon (2002), though 
sympathetic to her intentions argues that she does not give sufficient support 
to mass movements from below of workers and citizens, but encourages 
reliance on a paternalistic state. She particularly criticises the failure to 
consider the impact and implications of US world dominance.  
Though there is plenty of scope for engagement between social policy and 
CA, in the past this has not been cordial, as the famous debate about poverty 
analysis between Sen (1985) and Townsend (1985) in the 1980s indicates. It 
arose because CA disputed the validity of a poverty line, based on income-
based measures of poverty as limited, because of its concern with capability 
outcomes and variable conversion factors. However, despite caustic 
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exchanges, there was potential common ground between them. Both had faith 
in „objective‟ positivist measurement, and Townsend‟s relative definition of 
poverty as resources necessary for participation in a culturally prescribed way 
of life, involved a shift to a multidimensional concept of „deprivation‟, not that 
removed from Sen‟s concept of „flourishing‟. Both also failed to analyse the 
wider culture sufficiently, and the relational linkages of poverty to wider drivers 
of class inequality (Novak, 1996). However, as we have seen, Townsend was 
not alone in criticising a tendency he saw in Sen to residualism and limited 
state intervention. The dominant approaches to CA are clearly concerned with 
setting „minimum thresholds‟ than pursuing extensive equality of outcomes.  
  
 
Applying CA to the Majority World: Selected Critical 
Case Studies 
The above discussion indicates that CA should be a starting rather than 
finishing point. Operationalizing it as an evaluative strategy raises political and 
not simply technical issues. There is a need to foreground wider structures of 
power and inequality, and the extent to which more extensive change may be 
required to significantly improve human flourishing, with groups not just 
individuals being the basis for transformative social action.  
Undoubtedly CA provides support for a broad social policy agenda, in contrast 
to the limited neoliberal project of the market plus liberal democracy and 
consumerism. It acknowledges that there is „such a thing‟ as society, with 
equality and social justice requiring social and political intervention. It chimes 
with a growing awareness that economic growth and wealth expansion does 
not guarantee happiness or an improved quality of life (QoL) such as argued 
by. Layard (2005). However, as Rustin (2007) argues CA can provide a 
powerful critique of the utilitarian subjectivism that typically inform this new 
„science‟, providing the basis for a fuller and more dynamic view of quality of 
life (QoL) focuses more on „fulfilment‟ than simply gratification.    
Thus though CA in some ways chimes with Third Way social policy and 
advocacy of an „enabling state‟, its broad vision goes beyond the utilitarian 
calculus and Rawlsian basic income approach that has strongly influenced 
New Labour project. However the wider emphasis on combating social 
exclusion and multidimensional poverty, and tackling discriminatory barriers, 
opens up a wider agenda consistent with CA. Yet while there is rhetoric 
towards enablement and empowerment, there is a strong illiberal emphasis 
on compulsory integration, especially enforced participation in low paid work. 
Simply making people a bit better off by „making work pay‟ does not 
necessarily enhance capabilities once people are in work (Carpenter and 
Speeden, 2007). CA foregrounds these issues, favours local agency through 
decentralisation against top-down targeting, and acknowledges that people 
may legitimately value caring or community over market work (Dean et al, 
2005). It is however less useful in helping to foreground macroeconomic and 
social policies that address structural disadvantage and demand side causes 
of unemployment and low pay. It is true that New Labour‟s „social investment 
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state‟ (Giddens,1998) does challenge pure neoliberalism by pointing to the 
potentially productive effects of public expenditure. However humanistic 
concern are sidelined by the priority given to the return to capital through 
employability, skills enhancement and responsibilising of individuals (Clarke, 
2005). By contrast  a „capability state‟ would primarily defend entitlements on 
the grounds of social justice and people‟s wellbeing, with the onus being to 
showing how capitalist economic growth might contribute to or conflict with 
this goal . 
CA is gaining ground as a way of informing progressive social policy in 
developed capitalist societies. For example, the European Union‟s conceptual 
shift from a narrow income poverty perspective to a multidimensional „poverty 
and social inclusion‟ has been strongly influenced by Sen via the work u  by  
Atkinson (2002) for the European Commission, covering financial poverty 
defined in terms of 60% of the national median, income inequality, 
employment, health and education. Eighteen Level 1 and 2 „at risk of poverty‟ 
outcome indicators have been developed under these headings harmonised 
across the EU. Under the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) EU 
governments are „invited‟ to set targets through National Action Plans (NAPs) 
and assess their progress against them, adding Level 3 indicators of their 
choosing. This corresponds to a stronger EU intervention on social policy 
alongside the market liberalisation strategy, a broadening of its traditional 
focus on employment policy, and a growing integration of economic and social 
policy as part of the Lisbon Strategy.  Two points can be made here as part of 
a provisional assessment. First, Nolan (2003) argues that there is a need to 
develop the indicators further to include housing and homelessness, social 
participation and access to services, and to strengthen gender dimensions, 
and deepen health to include health inequalities. In other words, the current 
Social Indicators only implement CA to a limited extent.  Second, the „soft law‟ 
associated with the OMC contrasts with the firm law to implement the market, 
and hence currently subordinates social to economic considerations 
(O‟Connor, 2005). Salais and Villneuve (2005) have argued that CA offers the 
prospect of a more genuinely „social‟ Europe at odds with the Lisbon Strategy.  
At the national level, in 2005 Germany‟s National Action Plan for Social 
Inclusion drew explicitly on Sen for its national poverty and wealth reports 
(Arndt and Volkert, 2007: 22). However this has not been without controversy, 
as there have been accusations that the methodology significantly 
underestimated the rapid growth in material poverty between 1999 and 2005 
(Craigslist Heidelberg, 2008).  
There are a growing number of examples of efforts to apply CA to 
contemporary health and social policy, and in the process its overlap with over 
progressive frameworks becomes visible. Thus Burchadt (2004) argues that 
the social model‟s distinction between impairment and disability as a socially 
constructed discriminatory process, developed by the disabled people‟s 
movement, has direct parallels with CA. Hopper (2007) argues that CA is 
consistent with a „social recovery‟ model of schizophrenia which 
acknowledges a significant degree of impairment, but is optimistic than social 
provision can facilitate empowering participation in society. This needs to go 
alongside efforts to address wider disabling barriers associated with 
 11 
„patienthood‟ to realise a potential for personhood. Yet by far the most 
ambitious application of CA in the UK, has been The Equalities Review (2007) 
Fairness and Freedom (hereafter FR) decision to establish CA as the 
evaluative framework for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (ECHR) 
work. 
The Equalities Review, chaired by Trevor Phillips as head of the ECHR, 
audited past UK progress on equalities and established the criteria by which it 
would be further benchmarked up to 2010 and beyond. The language of the 
Report is restrained but it makes clear that while „progress‟ had been made 
over the past decade on equality fronts it was so slow that at current rates it 
will decades before substantial equality for the groups covered by the ECHR 
will be achieved. In calling for a renewed commitment to achieving equality 
the report proposes a new definition of an equal society which is virtually a 
paraphrase of Sen:  
An equal society protects and promotes equal, real freedom and 
substantive opportunity to live in the ways people value and would 
choose, so that everyone can flourish. An equal society recognises 
people‟s different needs, situations and goals and removes the barriers 
that limit what people can do and can be (FR: 6). 
The Report gives due recognition, up to a point, to economic inequality but 
sees this primarily as the result of poverty divorced from relations of class 
inequality. It also audits progress across a range of discriminations addressed 
by the recent spate of equalities laws. It develops a positive view of equality, 
clearly implying that human rights needs extending to cover ESC as well as 
CP rights, drawing on CA‟s concept of substantive freedom as  
Freedom from poverty, discrimination and disadavantage, but also 
freedom to be able to achieve the things that, individually, matter most 
to us. A more equal Britain would be both fairer and freer in the full 
meaning of these words, and is a goal worthy fighting for (FR: 141).  
The Review draws attention to challenges such as globalisation and 
demographic changes, the combined effects of which are leading to greater 
ethnic diversity, more older people, and increasing numbers of disabled 
people. Undoubtedly contemporary inequality is multidimensional, and not all 
the drivers are political economic in origin. However, they remain significant 
and class relations have significant impact on other forms of inequality. The 
Review early on limits the debate about action by claiming that it is self 
evident that the „old approach of a top-down state which pulls levers to 
improve outcomes for particular groups is no longer appropriate or effective‟ 
(FR: 7). It thus seeks to align CA with a New Labour supply side approach 
based on partnership between the state, employers, communities and 
citizens. Since this has been the model adopted since 1997, this begs the 
question of how such a system can be expected to lead to speedier advance 
in the future. The answer does not appear to be a more concerted attack on 
structural drivers of inequalities. This is reinforced by a view that:  
 12 
… greater equality will benefit everyone, and not just those currently 
disadvantaged….(It) will make our society better off, our economy 
stronger, our social fabric more cohesive (p 19).  
The Review thus largely rules out the possibility of significant structural 
intervention detrimental to entrenched interests to shape drivers as equality is 
in the interest of „everyone‟. What it calls the „economic‟, „social cohesion‟ and 
„moral‟ cases for equality are all seen to coalesce, and there is a reluctance to 
envisage that they might at least sometimes conflict e.g. that there might be 
an economic or social cost worth paying to enhance equalities by favouring 
some people over others. Instead The Review mostly proposes better 
governance (what it calls „tools‟) is the main way forward. Considerable 
emphasis is placed on holding politicians, and public and private sector 
organisations to account against the sophisticated and extensive CA outcome 
domains, combined with improved targeting policies, and more assertive 
public procurement policies to help tackle what more equality more rapidly ‟ it 
acknowledges are „persistent inequalities‟.  
Fairness and Freedom is undoubtedly a sophisticated practical application of 
CA which, as Burchadt (2008) one of its key architects argues, substantially 
answers critics‟ arguments that it cannot be operationalized except in rather 
crude ways. It hence has implications for similar coordinating equality bodies 
being set up in other EU countries. She argues that there is a need to show 
that CA provides a way integrating human rights and equality, with anti-
discriminatory action, which since 2006 is the remit of the ECHR, in ways that 
enhance both. In particular, she argues that it can handle effectively the 
„intersectionality‟ of a range of discriminations, some of which may come into 
conflict with each other, most notably sexuality and religious belief. Burchadt 
explains how, rather than starting directly from either Sen or Nussbaum, the 
research constructed „core‟ benchmarks from the International Covenants on 
CP and ESC rights, to which the UK has treaty obligations. This was 
combined with a more subjectivist approach via a „deliberative consultation‟, 
involving an Ipsos-MORI survey backed up by workshops and individual 
interviews. The aim was to arrive at a consensus on what constituted the 
„good life‟ needed for people to flourish. Burchadt acknowledges that the 
research was not as extensive as it might have been. However, she asserts 
that the results are a sufficiently valid for use by all public bodies not just the 
EHRC, combining „statutory‟ and participative elements, in terms of the 10 
equality benchmarks listed in Figure 2 below.   
 
[ Figure 2 near here ] 
 
Interestingly, some of the items that emerged spontaneously bore comparison 
to Nussbaum‟s list including hope, joy and celebration, having goals, and 
being close to nature (Burchadt, 2008: 214). One of the criticisms that Gough 
(2002) makes of Nussbaum‟s model compared to the theory of need 
developed with Doyal (Doyal and Gough, 1991)  is that she is too focused on 
optional or disputable elements. However they do appear to be high on 
people‟s own list of expressed needs. A separate capabilities list will be 
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developed for children, but there are no plans to extend this to other groups. 
This consensual approach highlights a tension in CA in giving recognition to 
diverse groups, but not always allowing them sufficient scope to define their 
own needs. Others such as Clark (2006) have therefore pioneered 
participative approaches. There is a need to be wary how „adaptive 
preferences‟ may sometimes scale down peoples‟ aspirations, while at others 
group aspirations may radically challenge mainstream opinion and practice.  
While Burchadt and the Review suggest that group struggle has led to a 
„pragmatic consensus‟ around recognition that will develop further in future, a 
conflict perspective might more realistically depict this as a compromise 
shaped by power realities. However this would of course mean a state body 
seeing going beyond reconciliation of „stakeholder‟ interests to actively side 
with disadvantaged and oppressed people.  
 One of the key issues in this regard is the neglect of working class 
capabilities, which receive only brief mention in The Review.  There is of 
course no anti-discrimination law against class, for good reason because it 
were to tackle it seriously it would fundamentally interfere with the basic 
operation of a capitalist society. As Bromley (2000: 51-2) argued, under New 
Labour, class became „the ghost in the machine of contemporary British 
politics, the “great unspoken” which is the source of the fear and anxiety 
which seems to motivate much current political discourse‟. Instead class 
became fragmented into a range of pathologies such as law and order, 
welfare mothers, worklessness etc seen as candidates for piecemeal social 
engineering rather than symptoms of structural malaise. In addition, though 
The Review is broad, it fails to highlight the discrimination and exclusion 
experienced by refugees and asylum seekers, and illegal workers, indicating 
that it was working more within the bounds of an exclusionary citizenship than 
an inclusive human rights paradigm.  
The Review talks of limited progress. While there have undoubtedly been 
have been equality gains since 1997 there have also been reversals, 
especially on CP rights. Among other things the right not to detained without 
trial has been seriously compromised in the name of the „war against terror‟, 
the right to protest significantly compromised by the 2005 Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act (SOCRA), extradition to the US since 2003 can now 
take place without an evidential justification (but not reciprocally), and the 
government has defended the legitimacy of evidence extracted by torture. In 
addition the boundaries of criminal behaviour have been significantly 
extended by the introduction of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and 
„summary justice‟ empowering police to impose fixed penalty notices (source 
for above: Atkins et al, 2007). New Labour has also extended conditionality of 
benefits and compulsory participation in low paid work (Carpenter and 
Speeden, 2008) None of these developments receives any mention in The 
Review, though since CA rightly frames CP as inseparable from ESC rights, it 
arguably should at least have drawn attention to them and the equality 
implications.    
In the ESC rights spheres of poverty and inequality, things have taken a turn 
for the worse since the Review was published. Poverty increased in 2006-7 
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for the second successive year, particularly affecting children, parents, 
pensioners and working-age childless adults. Income inequality as measured 
by the Gini coefficient has risen back to its highest ever level of 2000-01, the 
highest since comparable records began in 1961 (Brewer at al, 2008). The 
Review does not mention that New Labour has failed to reduce the inequality 
gap that widened under the Conservatives from 1979-97. This makes its 
policy approach appear rather timid and unlikely to deliver more than modest 
advances, welcome though these would be. The policy recommendations 
have very little to propose in terms of wider policy measures that could set a 
framework for greater „leverage‟ on inequalities, such as redistributive social 
policies and extending the positive duties from the public to include the private 
sectors, as we have seen are not part of the government‟s 2008 draft Equality 
Bill. In other words there is a failure to fully address the structural conversion 
factors that could really make a difference to equality outcomes. Since The 
Review was published, the end of the economic boom in 2008 and 
consequent recession is likely to impact most on those who benefited least in 
the years of plenty, and disrupts assumptions that the economy can simply be 
left to its own devices to deliver general prosperity.     
Conclusion: Towards the Revival of Ethical Social 
Policy? 
This article has conducted a critical but sympathetic review of CA as a 
potential paradigm for contemporary social policy in the developed capitalist 
world, focusing particularly on the work of the 2007 Equalities Review. CA is a 
conceptually sophisticated and practically realisable framework which appears 
to provide a means of reconciling a liberal emphasis on freedom with socialist 
collectivism, and balancing universalism with particularism. The Equalities 
Review has operationalized it in ways which to some extent, though not 
sufficiently, fulfils Fraser‟s (1995) call to combine a politics of „redistribution‟ 
and „recognition‟. CA has helped to rally opposition to neoliberalism at the 
global level and raised possibilities of pursuing a holistic approach to progress 
and development centred on the needs and aspirations of people, and 
lessons from it are now being drawn from the majority to the minority world. 
However I have sought to show that in doing so, if its full potential is to be 
realised, there is a need to connect it to a fuller political economic and social 
analysis that transcends the limited critique of growth oriented global 
capitalism embedded in mainstream CA approaches, developing a radical 
capabilities approach that addresses the contradiction between them. 
This article was written in the summer of 2008 when the political and 
economic derailing of the New Labour project had become apparent.  
Cruddas and Rutherford (2008) argued in The Guardian that part of the 
problem is that New Labour has been pursuing a „contractual‟ politics that 
eschewed „fraternal‟ concerns about „society, wellbeing and relationships‟, 
creating a vacuum the Conservatives are seeking to fill:   
The Labour government, (the new Conservatism) argues, has failed 
because it has abandoned the fraternity of ethical socialism in favour of 
state management  
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CA can help restore normative principles to social policy analysis which have 
been substantially evacuated since Tawney and Titmuss, at the same time 
transcending their nationalistic myopia. However, an appeal to reason and 
normative principles is not sufficient, and political struggle is necessary which 
Sen and Nussbaum – and the Equalities Review – at least partially 
acknowledge. CA also potentially offers an alternative to postmodern 
deconstruction, defining scope for more than critique and negative resistance 
and critique, but positive alternatives that provides a flexible „grand narrative‟ 
that also connects to other critical discourses, if can become more deeply 
embedded in critical sociology and political economy, and connect domestic 
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Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Capabilities 
1 Life – a normal life expectancy 
2 Bodily Health – good health including reproductive health 
3 Bodily Integrity – free movement, protection from violence, including sexual 
assault  
4 Senses, imagination and thought – a range of issues including creativity, 
artistic and political expression, and enjoyment of pleasure 
5 Emotions – emotional development and attachment, to love and be loved 
6 Practical reason – to develop a conception of good, and make life plans 
7 Affiliation – to be able to live for and in relation with others, to develop 
empathy, pursue justice and friendship 
8 Other Species – relations with the natural world and animals 
9 Play – to laugh and play and relax 
10 Control over one‟s environment – this includes political participation, 
material control over resources, and employment rights 
(Nussbaum 1998: 83-5)  
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Figure 2  
The Equalities Review List of Central and Valuable Capabilities for 
Adults 
1 To be alive 
2 To live in physical security 
3 To be healthy 
4 To be knowledgeable, to understand and reason, and to have the skills to    
participate in society 
5 to enjoy a comfortable standard of living, with independence and security 
6 To engage in productive and valued activities 
7 To enjoy individual, family and social life 
8 To participate in decision-making, have a voice and influence 
9 Of being and expressing yourself, and having self-respect 
10 Of knowing you will be protected and treated fairly by the law 
Source: Adapted from FR: 127-30 
 
